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Abstract: This paper aims at exploring a mechanism of new business development. To
understand how a business develops, we move our analytical focus from the level of a
focal business to the level of the “business ecosystem,” a collection of related
businesses and institutions. We pay special attention to a slowly advancing component
as a “reverse salient.” We comparatively examine the developmental process of the
mobile music business in Japan and Korea, and show how the interactions among
related businesses and music copyright institutions as a reverse salient shaped the
directions and speed of the development in each country.
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1. Introduction
When technological innovations offer a new business potential, firms strive
for prosperity and survival by creating a new business. For them it is critical to
properly understand how a new business is created and developed over time. In
particular, when a variety of new business ideas emerge and compete with each other, a
proper understanding of business development is indispensable. Yet, it is often hard to
foresee how a business potential might materialize. Without better understanding,
firms may overlook critical success factors and err in their management of the
situation.
This paper explores a mechanism by which a new business is created and
developed. We achieve this by moving our analytical focus up from the level of a
particular business of interest to the level of a collection of related businesses. We
argue that it is critical to look at complex interactions among various types of
1
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businesses as well as related institutions to understand the development process of a
business.
The goal of this paper is to adopt the concept of a “business ecosystem”
(Moore, 1993; Iansiti and Levien, 2004), which consists of a variety of interdependent
businesses and relevant social institutions, to understand the process of business
development. We show the value of looking at the level of a collection of businesses,
rather than at the level of a focal business stand-alone. In particular, we demonstrate
the importance of paying attention to a “reverse salient” (Hughes, 1983, 1987), which
refers to the part that has fallen behind in progress within the whole ecosystem. We
analyze the role and impact of a reverse salient on the developmental path of the
business ecosystem as a whole and the way in which it would affect the directions and
speed of the development of a focal business.
Empirically, this paper deals with the mobile music business, a business that
provides music to consumers through mobile internet, in Japan and Korea. We
comparatively examine how the mobile music business developed since the late 1990s
in these two countries from the perspective of the business ecosystem with a focus on
the influences of music copyright institutions as a reverse salient.
2. Analytical Viewpoint
A natural unit of business analysis is the market. A market consists of
competing business firms that provide mutually replaceable goods or services. A
particular business is formed for a particular market, and competition among the firms
within the market drives changes. Industrial organization economics, for example,
analyzes the relationship among market structure, the strategic behaviors of firms, and
industrial performance. Porter’s competitive strategy analysis (Porter, 1980) was based
on the framework of industrial organization economics, and a rich and fruitful stream
of strategic research has drawn on a similar framework.
However, when disruptive technologies bring about a new business potential,
this type of single-business level analysis may not be sufficient. The emergence of a
new business is often not without the influence of other interdependent businesses and
relevant social institutions. In such cases, stand-alone analysis at the level of a focal
business cannot give us a satisfactory explanation as to the nature of business
development. Thus, we need to raise our analytical viewpoint to a higher level of
analysis. The business ecosystem perspective could serve this purpose.
A business ecosystem is a loosely coupled system that consists of a focal
business and other types of interdependent businesses. It also encompasses
organizational actors and their relevant environmental components, such as markets,
2
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technologies, and institutions, which are related to the constituent businesses. Thus, in
the business ecosystem model, a particular business is not viewed as a stand-alone
entity, but rather as a part of a whole business ecosystem that spans a variety of
businesses. The ecosystem presumes a dynamic process in which interdependent
businesses evolve in an interactive manner as changes in a business set the stage for
reactive changes in other industries (Moore, 1993; Iansiti and Levien, 2004).
For most cases, the business ecosystem perspective might be irrelevant.
During a normal period, when technologies and other environmental factors are more
or less stable, constituent businesses remain independent of one another. Each business
can be managed and changed without being influenced by other businesses, and the
firms within it can behave rather freely without the need to pay much attention to other
firms outside of their business.
However, during periods of disturbance, caused by, for instance, radical
technological innovations, the business ecosystem does matter. Critical inter-business
relations surface, and this necessitates negotiations, coordination, and rearrangement
within the ecosystem. It is during these periods of radical change that the business
ecosystem perspective serves as a valuable viewpoint for understanding business
development. This is especially true in the field of information and communication
technologies (ICT), where discontinuous innovations arrive cyclically at frequent
intervals, and technological impacts cut across various businesses and industries
(Sampler, 1998). Here, the business ecosystem perspective is expected to make a great
contribution.
When we analyze business development at the level of the business
ecosystem, a holistic viewpoint would enable us to identify a part or component that
obstructs the system development as a whole. While technological innovation initiates
radical changes and affects a variety of businesses, each component in the ecosystem
exists in a different context with different interests and develops at a different speed.
When a change in a component disturbs the existing balance, corresponding changes in
other components should be made in order to regain balance and order within the
whole ecosystem. In this process of change, a ‘reverse salient’ refers to the part or
component that has fallen behind or out of phase with the others (Hughes, 1983, 1987).
It hinders the whole development of the ecosystem. Thus, a reverse salient plays a key
role in setting the direction and speed of business ecosystem development and in
shaping the structure of the focal business. A reverse salient could not be recognized
from the focal business stand-alone viewpoint. Rather, it is recognized only when you
look from the level of the business ecosystem.

3
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3. Research Design and Data
The empirical field of this paper is the developmental process of the mobile
music business in Japan and Korea. This is a business that allows consumers to use
mobile phone handsets to replay music files that are downloaded through the mobile
internet. Both Japan and Korea have been at the forefront of mobile internet diffusion
and development in the world. The mobile music business in both countries has grown
rapidly to become the largest market among mobile internet businesses and to establish
a notable position within the music industry. Although the basic technologies and
structure of the business look similar in both counties, substantial differences exist in
some dimensions, such as how fast new businesses were developed, who became
winners or losers in the competition, and the size of the market.
How has the mobile music business in both countries been created and
developed? What is the underlying mechanism behind their divergent developmental
path? The goal of our empirical study is to answer these questions by analyzing the
business development at the level of the business ecosystem with a focus on a reserve
salient.
The mobile music business is served by mobile content providers (CPs) that
produce music files and supply the files to customers via mobile internet. However, the
business does not function in a stand-alone manner. It is surrounded by a variety of
related businesses and institutions, all of which constitute the mobile music business
ecosystem together with related technologies and markets. They include the mobile
communication network business, the mobile handset business, the music business,
music copyright institutions, and the government bodies that design and implement
public policies and regulations on mobile communication. We will analyze how the
components within this ecosystem interact, negotiate, and coordinate with each other
during the process of developing the mobile music business.
As a reverse salient of the developmental process, we pay special attention to
music copyright institutions. There are two reasons for this. First, all music related
businesses must deal with music copyright issues in order to successfully implement
their businesses. Second, music copyright institutions do not change rapidly. Since
music copyright laws and rules involve various businesses and public organizations,
each with its own interests that often conflict with the interests of the others, any
change in music copyright institutions occurs slowly and requires substantial energy.
The copyright institutions, therefore, are likely to fall behind the changes made by
others, such as technological innovations and strategic moves made by some firms, to
become a reverse salient in the overall mobile music business ecosystem.
Other components could also be viewed as a reverse salient. Yet, for the
4
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reasons mentioned above, this paper focuses on music copyright institutions, and we
analyze how they set the directions and timing of the mobile music business
development. An institution here refers to any one of the varying types of
arrangements that govern and constrain social and economic activities. It includes not
only formal arrangements, such as law, rules, and public institutional bodies, but also
informal ones, such as habits, customs, and widely shared views, which also influence
how a business is run.
The following analysis is based on the information and data collected as of
the summer of 2005 from our interviews with practitioners, reports, statistics, and
articles available in Japan and Korea1. The appendix shows a short history of the
mobile music business in the two countries to be covered in this paper.
4. Developmental Process of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea
4.1. Overview of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea
Japan and Korea are ahead of other countries in the diffusion of mobile
internet services 2 . Among various mobile internet services that have emerged,
music-related services have been most successful in the two countries. They
established the largest market and drove the further development of mobile internet
businesses. To date, the services described in Table 1 have been available in both Japan
and Korea.
These mobile music businesses rapidly grew into a large market. The most
notable was Japan’s ringing melody (“Chaku-Mero”) service. The revenue from
ringing melody sites was 700 million U.S. dollars in 2002, accounting for 40% of the
whole mobile content market. As a 3G music service, KDDI launched a ringing song
service (“Chaku-Uta”) in December 2002, and then started a full-track music
download service (“Chaku-Uta-Furu”) in November, 2004. With immediate successes,
the market size of these services grew to be 1.1 billion US dollars in 2004 (see Table
2).

1

The firms we interviewed include NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, Vodafone, JASRAC, Yamaha, Xing (Japan),
KAPP, Danal (Korea). The list of the reports we used for analysis, not shown in this paper, will be
provided upon request to the authors.
2
As of January 2002, mobile communication subscribers amounted to 66% of the total population in
Japan and 76% in Korea. Among the subscribers, those owning handsets with a mobile internet function
amounted to 86% in Japan and 92% in Korea in 2004. Mobile internet services, embodied in the 2.5G
mobile communication system, were first launched in February 1999 in Japan and September 1999 in
Korea, and grew rapidly with e-mail and content services. Both countries then moved to a 3G mobile
communication system in October 2001 in Japan and June 2002 in Korea.
5
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-52

In Korea, the ringing melody service (“Bellsori”) was also the most popular
mobile content service. The ringing melody market grew to be about 80 million US
dollars, while the ring-back song (“Coloring”) market grew to nearly 30 million U.S.
dollars. Together, they accounted for about a half of the 230 million U.S. dollar total
mobile content market in 2002. In November 2002, SKT began providing ringing song
(“Livebell”) and full-track music download (“MOD”) services simultaneously. Then in
November 2004, SKT launched its U-Music (Ubiquitous-Music) service – the first
time this service was offered in the world. Korea was behind Japan in launching
ringing melody and ringing song services, but then moved ahead by introducing
full-track music download and U-Music services. Maintaining high momentum for
changing the way music is distributed to customers, the mobile music business in
Korea finally outgrew the traditional offline music business in 2004 (see Table 2).
4.2. Ringing Melody Service in Japan and Korea
The ringing melody service was the most successful during the early days of
mobile internet business development in both Japan and Korea. The service in Japan
established the world’s largest internet music market, including both wired and mobile
music download services. Whereas the world internet music download market
(excluding ringing melody in Japan) was estimated to be 341 million US dollars in
2004, the Japanese ringing melody market had already reached 664 million US dollars
by 2002. While there were several factors to explain this success, Japan’s copyright
management institution played a key role in the smooth and rapid development of the
ringing melody service (Takeishi and Lee, 2006).
As ringing melody services use only the melody of original music, the
copyright fee is paid only to the composer. In Japan, the majority of music copyrights
are managed by JASRAC (the Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers, and
Publishers) on behalf of the copyright holders. For the ringing melody service,
JASRAC mandated that content providers of ringing melodies should pay a copyright
fee of five US cents (or 7.7% of the information usage price) to JASRAC. This rule
was established through the negotiation between JASRAC and NMRC (Network
Music Rights Conference), which represents nine institutions including Association of
Musical Electronics Industry, Recording Industry Association of Japan, and Internet
Association Japan to promote music businesses on the internet.
This official copyright rule contributed to the smooth launch and subsequent
growth of the ringing melody business in two ways. First, as anyone can provide the
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ringing melody service just by paying the copyright fee to JASRAC, a large number of
CPs entered a highly competitive market. The resulting intensified competition led to
better and cheaper services. Second, JASRAC effectively repressed the spread of
illegal services. In the beginning, as ringing melodies were gaining wide popularity, a
large number of free, unofficial services that neglected to pay copyright fees to
JASRAC sprung into existence. To counter this undesirable trend, JARAC vigorously
monitored and charged the copyright violators. By cooling down the movement,
JASRAC made an important contribution to the establishment of a sound market basis
for legal services.
In Korea, most copyright fees were collected by KOMCA (Korea Music
Copyright Association). In principle, CPs paid 8% of their revenue to KOMCA as the
copyright fee. The basic structure of the business looked similar to that of Japan.
However, there existed some seemingly subtle but critical differences that cannot be
overlooked by those who want strict copyright protection and management. First, the
copyright fee was charged based on certain percentages of the CP’s total monthly
revenue, not per melody download. CPs thus could exert larger control on setting their
service price. Since Korean CPs often provided a variety of content services, such as
screen savers, they used free ringing melodies as a promotional tool to attract
subscribers. Second, since Korean mobile carriers and CPs did not make available
detailed data on melody downloads, copyright management remained inaccurate and
opaque.
Copyright holders complained about ineffective copyright management, but
no significant improvement was made in a timely manner. Indeed, Korea’s
fundamental problem resided in the fact that general recognition for copyright
protection in Korea had been comparatively weak among not only users but also
copyright claimers, such as recording companies, composers, and lyricists, who were
supposed to be in the position to strongly uphold their rights. Such weak recognition
stemmed from the structure and history of the Korean music industry.
First, most recording companies in Korea were small and medium-sized
firms that lacked the resources and power to command strong copyright protection.
Until the mid-1980s, the Korean government designated the recording industry as a
protected sector only for small and medium-sized firms and prohibited large
conglomerates from entering the business. Although a later deregulation allowed large
firms to enter the recording industry, none of these bigger firms achieved success. The
structure of the music industry remained unchanged, and the weak voice of the
industry could not change Korea’s recognition of copyright protection.
Second, copyrights were not effectively managed even within the recording
7
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industry itself. According to the established practice, small record retailers usually
neglected to report correct sales revenue so as to avoid taxation. Also, recording
companies usually gave an advance to artists and producers, and the copyright fee was
paid only when the record sales reached a pre-negotiated target volume, which rarely
occurred. Because of such practices, even the recording companies had not been eager
to build up strong copyright institutions.
An international comparison on copyright revenue (see Table 3) reveals that
Korean copyright management is not strict. Compared to Japan and the U.S., copyright
revenues from copy and distribution were significantly smaller in Korea. This revenue
structure indicates that illegal copy and distribution were prevalent in Korea. One
estimate revealed that sales of illegal music copies reached almost one quarter of the
whole legal market size (100 US million dollars) in 1996. Interestingly, in the later
stages of the mobile music business development, such weak copyright institutions
enabled Korea to introduce new mobile music services more swiftly than Japan, as will
be discussed below.
4.3. Music Download Service in Japan
The ringing song (“Chaku-Uta) service, which is an advanced mobile music
service designed to provide part of an original song, rather than just the melody, was
launched in December 2002 by KDDI on the 3G mobile communication system. The
service gained popularity and grew steadily to reach 90 US million dollars in 2004
with 10 million downloads per month on average. While the other two mobile carriers
also launched a similar service about one year later, the popularity of the ringing song
service helped KDDI gain more subscribers as the first provider of this service.
The ringing song service and the ringing melody service appear similar;
however, there was a critical difference between the two services in terms of copyright
management. Ringing song used part of an original song. Thus, the providers should
pay a full set of copyright fees for not only the ‘music copyright’ held by the
composers and lyricists, but also for the ‘music neighboring copyright,’ which includes
‘copyright in sound recordings.’ The later copyright was usually owned by artists,
musicians, recording companies, and artist management offices.
Music copyrights were collectively managed by JASRAC and other
registered institutional bodies based on the Copyright Management Business Law. As
explained above, this institutional arrangement realized a competitive market for the
ringing melody business. However, neighboring copyrights were controlled by the
individual claimers, without any formal institution for their collective management.
When a ringing-song CP wanted to use recorded music, it was compelled to negotiate
8
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with and receive permission from the neighboring copyright claimers individually in
advance. The claimers could exercise exclusive copyrights, and there was thus no
guarantee for the provider to get permission.
In the ringing song business, the exclusive usage of neighboring copyrights
limited the number of CPs competing in the business. Instead of giving permissions to
other CPs, most recording companies got directly involved in the service, exploiting
the advantage of their exclusive copyrights on popular music. It was under this
condition that Label Mobile, a joint venture of 18 Japanese recording companies
established for the mobile music business, came to take a dominant market share in the
ringing song business. This CP exclusively provided a large variety of popular songs to
capture more than 50% of the market share in 2004.
The recording companies regarded their dominance in the ringing song
market as fair rewards. They invested immense resources to make hit music and
promote star artists. However, in the ringing melody business, those CPs founded by
former wired-karaoke companies and video game producers, such as GIGA, Xing,
Dai-ichikosho, and Dwango, took a dominant market share. Those companies easily
entered the business by paying copyright fees to JASRAC and were highly competitive
in the business since they could quickly transform their digitalized melodies, originally
prepared for the karaoke business, for the mobile ringing service. Recording
companies did not have the capability to compete with these companies. In contrast, in
the ringing song business, recording companies were protected by neighboring
copyrights. Facing declining CD sales, recording companies came to recognize the
ringing song business as a new, attractive market.
From the consumers’ point of view, however, the ringing song service was
not fully satisfactory. Some popular songs were not available, once again because of
the way in which neighboring copyrights are managed and controlled in Japan. In
contrast to the US and European music industries, there are many cases in Japan in
which artist management offices or subsidiaries of TV network companies hold
neighboring copyrights rather than recording companies themselves. Since some of
these companies did not give permission to recording companies, and instead
established their own CPs, even Label Mobile could not cover some of the popular
songs. The ringing song service for these songs was either offered exclusively by
different CPs or not at all. This was inconvenient for customers, who were forced to
take the time to find whether and where one could find their favorite songs.
Furthermore, as each ringing song was provided only by a CP, market competition was
limited.
The copyright law endows the copyright claimer with the exclusive right to
9
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use. The behavior of these copyright holders was thus legal. However, the business
structure raised concerns over limited competition. In March 2005, the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission (JFTC) issued a recommendation for the five leading founders of
Label Mobile (Avex, Sony Music Entertainment, Toshiba EMI, Universal Music, and
Victor Entertainment) to permit other CPs to use their music for the ringing song
service. JFTC argued that the major labels prevented third parties from using
copyrights without any ‘justifiable’ reasons. Four of the five recording companies, with
the exception of Toshiba EMI, refused to follow the recommendation, and the case is
still pending.
Although a music creator’s exclusive use of neighboring copyrights caused
anticompetitive concerns, the condition of the ringing song service improved.
Stimulated by JFTC, an increasing number of recording companies and artist
management offices began to issue copyright permission to multiple CPs. The number
of available ringing songs continuously increased to reach 200,000 on 397 sites as of
September 2005.
In the meantime, KDDI launched a full-track music download
(“Chaku-Uta-Furu) service in November 2004. The new service costs 3 US dollars per
song and takes 30-40 seconds to download to the handset. A mobile handset can save
about 40 songs, and an external memory card can increase the storage capacity to more
than 100 songs. The full-track music download service started with 6 CP sites with
10,000 songs available and reached 46 sites with 60,000 songs in September 2005.
According to KDDI, in 2005 while the market for ringing melodies continued to
slowly decline and that of ringing songs matured, the market for full-track music kept
rapidly growing. The full-track music service gained an increasing weight within the
mobile music business as a most advanced service in Japan. As in the case of the
ringing song service, while there remained some inconveniences for customers and
anticompetitive concerns in the mobile full-track music business, improvements have
been being made.
4.4. Music Download Service in Korea
The ringing song and full-track music download services were together
introduced in November 2002 by SKT when it launched the 3G content service. Later
on, the other two carriers also started the same services. Compared to Japan, the
ringing song service started one month earlier, and the full-track music download
service began two years earlier in Korea.
As in the case of the ringing melody service, although the services seem
similar between the two countries, the business structure under the surface is different.
10
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In Japan, because of the exclusive neighboring copyright usage, wired-karaoke or
game producing companies could not enter the ringing song service market, and
recording companies won a dominant market share. In contrast, in Korea, former
ringing melody CPs, which were mostly those firms specialized in information and
communication technologies, could diversify into the ringing song and full-track music
download services. Recording companies or artists management offices could not enter
the business. It was the Korean mobile carriers that had designed and controlled the
business structure by exploiting their relatively strong power against recording
companies.
Upon starting new services, SKT launched an integrated site where
consumers could search and download music. Though many CPs worked behind the
site to arrange copyright issues and develop digital files, consumers could not
recognize individual CPs, and the mobile carrier controlled the services more directly
than before and in Japan. The Korean mobile carriers claimed 30% of the service
revenue as a handling fee, which was much higher than the fee (10%) for the ringing
melody service and than KDDI’s fee (9%) for the same services in Japan. This
difference indicates the strong power of the Korean carriers.
Another difference is that in Korea in 2003, right after ringing song and
full-track music download services started, numerous public and private organizations
were newly established to collectively manage and mediate neighboring copyrights.
Such institutions to manage neighboring copyrights did not exist in Japan or in any
other countries. These organizations simplified the cumbersome process of copyright
negotiation and coordination and systemized copyright management. By getting
copyright permission from these organizations, CPs, backed by carriers, could provide
most of popular Korean music by paying standard copyright fees.
Why were such new institutions established in Korea? First, previous
experiences of the Korean music industry in the PC-based internet music service,
which was filled with confusion and crisis, were influential.
Since 2000, as one of the most advanced PC-based internet network in the
world diffused in Korea, free music services, such as Bugsmusic (music streaming
service) and Soribada (peer-to-peer file download service) caused devastating effects
on the music industry. Bugsmusic and Soribada attracted 8 million and 20 million
users, respectively. To force these companies to respect copyrights, the recording
industry and copyright holders had engaged in many rounds of legal and political
haggling, which took five years.
There were other failures. The first online music download service was
launched as early as 1997 and was based on home PC-VAN (Valued Added Network).
11
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However, the service survived for only one year and was abandoned because of the
failure of copyright negotiations among recording companies, VAN providers, and CPs.
Also, recording companies launched their own internet download service in 1999;
however, the service could not survive as it was severely oppressed by free illegal
music services. These bitter experiences drove an urgent need for establishing
well-ordered institutions for managing music copyrights.
The second reason such collective neighboring copyright management
services were developed in Korea was related to the Korean government’s beneficial
policy to promote the online digital content business. After the financial crisis in 1997,
the Korean government began strategically promoting the cultural content industry as a
new dynamo for economic development. It recognized that music copyrights should be
used more openly in the internet environment.
These two factors – bitter industry experiences and influential government
policy – together prompted the establishment of new institutions, including KAPP
(Korean Association of Phonogram Producers). It was established in March 2003 as
the first public organization in the world to collectively manage neighboring
copyrights for the online music business. In the beginning, 82 relatively small
recording companies entrusted their music copyrights to KAPP, and 9 online music
business operators subscribed to the copyright usage program. However, four major
recording companies opposed the idea of entrusting copyrights to a third party, and
they jointly founded Manine Media, a private copyright publisher designed to manage
copyrights for these recording companies. In addition, many other private publishing
companies were also established.
Supported by these institutions and well-established control by powerful
mobile communication carriers, the mobile music business expanded rapidly and
outgrew the offline music business in market size in 2004 (Table 2). The mobile music
services thus became an important revenue source for recording companies, which
could not benefit from the PC-based internet and subsequently suffered from the
decline of their traditional off-line business. However, this does not mean that
everybody was happy. Recording companies were far from being satisfied with the
mobile carriers’ excessive and growing control over the music business.
4.5. Ubiquitous Music Service in Korea
The mobile music business in Korea moved further ahead when SKT started
the U-Music (Ubiquitous Music) service in November 2004. The other two carriers
soon started a similar service. Breaking down the barrier between mobile and fixed
internets, the U-Music service provided both full-track music in MP3 format and
12
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-52

music streaming. Consumers could play music on their mobile handsets, PCs, and
other portable devices. In contrast to previous services, mobile carriers internalized the
new business. They directly provided the service by themselves, and no CPs were
allowed to enter the business. The U-music service by LGT and SKT attracted 2
million and 2.3 million subscribers, respectively, as of July 2005.
The development of this new service was led by the introduction of MP3
phones. The MP3 phone is equipped with the capacity to play MP3 files, and caused
serious conflicts of interest among related industries. The key issue was whether MP3
phones should be compatible with the exiting MP3 files saved on users’ PCs. Most of
MP3 files were illegally downloaded through PC-based internet. A possible serious
problem was that once MP3 phones became fully compatible with existing PC MP3
files, they would not only destroy the existing mobile music business, but also damage
future development of the online music business as a whole.
While handset manufacturers wanted to produce fully compatible handsets to
stimulate a rapid diffusion, record companies understandably opposed such a plan and
demanded full incompatibility with the existing illegal files. Mobile carriers stayed
closer to recording companies, calculating the potential of the music download market.
Through government mediation, a tentative agreement to limit the replaying time of
illegal files to 72 hours was about to be made.
Suddenly, LG Telecom, the smallest mobile communication carrier in Korea,
withdrew from the negotiations and began selling fully compatible MP3 phones to gain
a market share. Their decision was in line with the interests of LG Electronics, the
handset manufacturer in the LG group. LGT introduced unregulated MP3 phones and
successfully increased subscriber numbers. Carefully watching this success, the other
mobile carriers also began providing fully compatible mobile handsets. As MP3
phones blurred the boundaries between fixed and mobile internets, mobile carriers
came to fully realize the most advanced mobile music business by launching U-Music
services.
However, these moves by the carriers seriously offended the music industry.
KPPA, recording companies, and other music creators legally and politically fought
back against LGT’s selfish decision. In November 2004, they reached an agreement
that LGT would provide 10 million US dollar to fund development in the music
industry and would pay 80% of their revenue as a copyright fee. Under these
conditions, LGT was allowed to provide free U-Music service for six months, and
gained copyright usage permission for 1.3 million songs.
Without much coordination in advance, SKT started the U-Music service
with only 900,000 songs. Although SKT paid 48% of the revenue as a copyright fee, it
13
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never satisfied copyright claimers. In an attempt to strengthen its own music business
and bargaining power over other recording companies, SKT acquired YBM Seoul
Records, which was one of the largest recording companies in Korea. By entering the
PC-based internet market, mobile carriers initiated competition with companies in that
market. Relationships among related businesses would become further complicated,
and it remains to be seen what kind of order will emerge within the mobile music
ecosystem in Korea.
5. Discussion and Implications
Our observations show that the development of the mobile music business
could not be fully explained by looking solely at the mobile music business served by
CPs. For a better understanding, it was necessary to look at complex interactions
among related businesses (the mobile music business ecosystem), including the mobile
carriers, handset producers, recording companies, and artist management offices.
Technological changes determined which businesses would be involved. In
the beginning, ringing melodies were manually input by users. The development of
mobile internet then realized the potential to distribute ready-made melody files. Next,
new technologies made it possible to distribute parts of original songs and, ultimately,
full-track music. Finally, the U-Music service broke down the barrier between mobile
and PC-based internets. As technologies advanced, the scope of relevant businesses
expanded. On each occasion, new expectations as well as new concerns emerged, and
negotiations and coordination were needed to build a new order. The process was not
technologically determined, but rather socially constructed. Although the same
technologies were adopted in the mobile music industries of both Japan and Korea, the
business development in each country was embedded in the society and history and
correspondingly took divergent paths.
One factor that shaped the developmental path was the inter-industry power
structure. In Korea, the power of recording companies was weaker than that of mobile
carriers and handset manufactures. In contrast, recording companies and artist
management offices in Japan maintained relatively stronger power over others. We
were able to capture such a difference by examining the winners and losers in the
mobile music business of the two countries. In ringing melody service of Japan, the,
wired-karaoke companies and game companies were successful, while recording
companies and content creators dominated the ringing song and full-track music
download services. In Korea, by contrast, technology-based CPs succeeded in the
ringing melody service. Mobile carriers then took control of the ringing song and
full-track music download services. In the U-Music service, they integrated the service,
14
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thereby kicking out incumbent CPs.
Another critical factor which affected the development path was music
copyright institutions, to which we paid special attention as a reverse salient of the
mobile music business ecosystem. Under Japan’s firmly established copyright
institutions, copyright claimers and content creators could exert strong influence.
Negotiations between these well-trenched copyright holders and other businesses
consumed energy and time, and, as the boundaries of the business ecosystem expanded,
the development of new services was slowed down.
In Korea, with a repeated pattern of ‘service first and negotiation second,’
new services were rapidly introduced. Under weak copyright institutions, companies
with technological capabilities could take leadership in developing new services to
their advantage, while the market of music content remained relatively small 3 .
However, a counter movement to strengthen music copyright institutions has been
made. Both public and private organizations were established to collectively manage
and mediate neighboring copyright usage. The recording industry also strengthened its
voice and political influence and somehow prevented LGT from making extreme
advancements in the market.
A higher priority on copyright protection in Japan slowed the speed of new
business introduction, and emphasis on technological advancement in Korea brought
confusion and disorder in business development. These problems vividly attest to the
common difficulty of achieving a delicate balance between copyright protection and
technology-led business creations. In essence, there is no difference between Japan and
Korea in that copyright institutions influenced the direction and speed of the business
development.
Overall, this paper has demonstrated that, in order to gain better
understanding of how a new business is created and developed over time, it is
beneficial to raise our analytical focus to the level of the business ecosystem and to pay
attention to the role of a reverse salient in the shaping of the whole system
development.
As Henderson and Clark (1990) indicated, technological innovations could
cause two types of changes in a product system: one within individual components,
3

Because of different populations (Japan 127 million: Korea 48 million in 2003) and per capita GDP
(32,850 US dollars: 14,118 US dollars in 2004), a simple comparison may be misleading. However, the
music market size (6,315 million US dollar: 335 million US dollars in 2004) and the music copyright fee
revenue (930 million US dollars: 40 million US dollars in 2002) in Korea was much smaller than in
Japan, compared to the total national private consumption (2.4 trillion US dollar: 0.3 trillion US dollar
in 2003), the number of domestic automobile sales (5.7 million: 1.6 million in 2002), and the number of
domestic PC sales (1.2 million: 0.3 million in 2002).
15
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and the other in the relationship among different components. In a similar vein,
changes in business ecosystem can be classified into two categories: 1) changes in
individual business, and 2) changes in the relationship among different types of related
businesses. In the former case, business development may be effectively grasped by
the traditional analytical concepts of industrial organization economics and
competitive strategy research. However, for the later case, we need to shift our
analytical viewpoint to that of the business ecosystem, which would arouse special
attention to inter-business relationship. This analytical viewpoint is expected to be of
great value for the ICT fields, where frequent technological innovations produce
wide-spreading impacts across a variety of businesses, as in the case of the mobile
music business.
When we elevate the analytical level from that of an individual business to a
collection of businesses, we come to find out that non-economic factors, such as power
structure, societal values, and underlying history, play significant roles in driving the
business development. Each business has its market, and the market competition more
or less defines how the business should be run and developed if the changes are limited
to those within the business itself. Customer voices somehow declare winners and
loser through competition. However, inter-business relationships cannot be fixed by
market competition, because there is no common market between different businesses.
Therefore, if the changes go beyond an individual business, non-economic factors are
likely to matter more. A change in the level of analysis thus implies a change in factors
to be examined. Those firms that want to prosper by creating a new business need to
pay as much attention to social and political factors as to technology development and
market competition.
In order to explore the proposed approach and its academic and practical
implications, we need to further elaborate our analytical viewpoint and empirical data,
both of which are still sketchy in this paper, to build a more rigorous framework with
theoretical foundations and analyze the data in a more systematic manner.
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Table 1.
Mobile Music Services in Japan and Korea
Name, Start Time
Japan
Korea
Chaku- Bellsori
Mero
2000/8
1999/12

Type

Outline of Service

Ringing
Melody

A service that allows subscribers to download a melody to be used
as a mobile handset’s ring tone. NTT DoCoMo started the service
first in Japan, and all the three mobile carriers started at almost the
same time in Korea.

Ring-Back
Song

A service that allows phone call receivers to choose melodies for
their callers to listen to while waiting for the receivers to answer.
SKT in Korea first started this service, and NTT DoCoMo in
Japan adopted it later.

MerodiKoru
2003/9

Coloring
2002/3

Ringing
Song

A service that allows subscribers to download part of an original
music (30-45 seconds) song to be used as the mobile handset’s
ring tone. It became technologically possible with the introduction
of the 3G system. KDDI in Japan and SKT in Korea first started
the service.

ChakuUta
2002/12

Livebell
2002/11

Full-Track A service that allows subscribers to download full-track music to Chaku-Uta Music-OnMusic
be replayed on their mobile handset. Consumers can enjoy the
-Furu
Demand
Download music itself rather than using it as a ring tone. SKT in Korea 2004/11 2002/11
started the full music and music video download service together,
and KDDI first started it in Japan.
U-Music A service that allows subscribers to download full-track music via
(Ubiquitous both mobile and PC-based internet, to be replayed on MP3
Music)
phones, PCs, and portable MP3 players on monthly fee basis.
Subscribers can also enjoy streaming music to mobile handsets
and PCs. SKT and LGT in Korea first launched the service. It is
currently not available in Japan.

-

U-Music
2004/11

Note:
1. The service name is not a general term, but the most popular name used by particular firms.
2. Before the mobile internet ringing melody, a similar service was provided in SMS format in both
countries. In addition, full-track music download service was provided on PHS networks earlier in
Japan. However, none of these previous services used internet as the distribution channel.
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Table 2.
The Music Business Market in Japan and Korea
Unit: Million US Dollar
2000
Japan

2002

2003

2004

Offline

6,174

5,934

5,808

5,319

5,202

Online

134

519

689

929

1,149

-

16

25

32

50

134

503

664

897

1,099

6,308

6,453

6,497

6,248

6,351

Offline

410

373

286

183

134

Online

44

91

134

184

201

PC-based Internet

14

28

5

8

17

Mobile Internet

30

63

129

176

184

454

464

420

367

335

PC-based Internet
Mobile Internet
Total

Korea

2001

Total

Note:
1.
The data exclude the karaoke, concert, and broadcasting markets, while including the rental CD
market.
2.
No data is available for the PC-based internet market in 2000 in Japan.
3.
There are different statistics available for the Japanese mobile internet market. For instance, MCA,
Inc. estimated 700 million US dollar in 2001, 980 million US dollars in 2002, and 1.1 billion US
dollars in 2003. This estimate is larger than the number shown in this table. MCA also estimated
that the ringing melody service accounted for 50% of the total, which is larger than the number
shown in this table (40%).
Source: Digital Content Association of Japan, Music Industry Association of Korea, Korea IT Industry
Promotion Agency.
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Table 3.
Music Industry Royalties in the U.S., Japan, and Korea (2001)
Unit: Million US Dollars, %
U.S.A.

Japan

Korea

World

Performance-Based Income

914.7

47.1

358.9

38.5

34.0

82.1

3,686.3

49.0

Reproduction-Based Income

655.0

33.8

432.4

46.4

7.2

17.5

2,754.0

36.6

Distribution-Based Income

331.9

17.1

56.3

6.0

0.2

0.4

812.8

10.8

Interest Investment Income

37.1

1.9

0.6

0.1

0.0

0.0

168.8

2.2

1.8

0.1

83.3

8.9

0.0

0.0

99.5

1.3

1,940.4

100.0

931.6

100.0

41.4

100.0

7,521.3

100.0

Miscellaneous Income
Total

Note:
1. Performance-Based Income includes radio, TV/Cable/Satellite, and live performance.
Reproduction-Based Income includes phono mechanical, synchronization, private copy, and reprint of
printed music. Distribution-Based Income includes sales of printed music and rental/public lending.
2. The left column is income and right column is percentage for each country. Data in the World column
includes 49 leading countries.
Source: National Music Publishers’ Association, Inc.
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Appendix: A Short History of Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea
Japan
1996

1997

7
9
3
5
6
8
9

Korea

AMEI,JASRAC, and wired-karaoke companies reached an tentative agreement
on copyright fee guideline.
Mobile handset with ringing melody function was first introduced in Japan.
NTT DoCoMo started mobile data communication service.
Home PC-VAN companies started music download service.
Toyo Astel started ringing melody service for PHS handset.
Network Music Rights Conference (NMRC）was founded.
AMEI, JASRAC, and wired-Karaoke companies agreed on the official copyright
fee guideline. /NMRC proposed JASRAC to hold regular meetings to coordinate
network music copyrights.

1998

5

1999

7 A guide book to input ringing melody manually made bestseller.
11 JASRAC and NMRC reached a tentative agreement on network copyright fee.
2 NTT DoCoMo launched i-mode service.
6
9
10

Home PC-VAN companies stopped music download service after copyright
coordination failed with recording companies.

Yaho started ringing melody service in SMS format. /Korean government
legislated Cultural Industry Promotion Law.

GIGA Networks started free manual ringing melody guide on i-mode to NTT
DoCoMo subscribers.
GIGA Networks commercialized manual ringing melody guide.
Doremi Record launched Doremi Music, an MP3 download service on PC-based
Internet.
Korean government officially announced the policy to deregulate collective
institutional body to mediate music neighboring copyright.

11
12 GIGA Networks started ringing melody download service on i-mode to NTT
DoCoMo subscribers. /Sony Entertainment launched Bit-Music, a music
download service on PC-based Internet.
2000

2
4

5
7
8

2001

Bugsmusic started free music streaming service on PC-based Internet.
JASRAC and NMRC reached the second tentative agreement./ Major recording
companies launched Labelgate,a joint venture for Internet music download
service.
Soribada started free P2P file exchange service.
Music copyright was revised to recognize Digital Transmission Right.
Yaho started mobile Internet ringing melody service with three mobile carriers.

JASRAC and NMRC agreed on the official network copyright fee.

11 DDI Pocket started Keitaide Music service.
1 NTT DoCoMo started M-stage Music.

Music copyright institituions and recording companies brought case against
Soribada.
Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism announced Contents Korea Vision 21,
the cultural content industry promotion plan.

6
7 Major recording companies founded Label Mobile, a joint venture for ringing
song service.
10 NTT DoCoMo started FOMA as 3G mobile service. /Copyright Management
Business Law took efect.
11
2002

3
4

KDDI started 3G mobile telecommunication service in CDMA 2000 1x
standard.

5
11 KDDI started ringing song service.

2003

2004

2005

Music copyright institutional bodies and recording companies brought case
against Bugsmusic.
Witcom started ring-back song service to SKT subscribers.

KTF launched Fimm, the 3G mobile telecommunication service.
SKT launched JUNE as 3G content service, and started ringing song and fulltrack music download services.

12 Vodafone started Vodafone Global Standard, the 3G mobile telecommunication
service.
2
Korean government announced First Online Digital Contents Industry
Development Plan(2003-2005）.
3
KAPP, the government-recognized agency, was established to collectively
manage and mediate music neighboring copyright.
4
Manine Media, the private copyright publishing organization, was founded by
major recording company.
9 NTT DoCoMo started Merodi-Coru(ring-back song) service.
12 Vodafone launched ringing song service.
1 NTT DoCoMo started Chaku-Motion(ringing song) service.
3
Bugsmusic announced to stop free service and to observe official copyright
guideline. /Negotiation to regulate MP3Phone failed.
4 Labelgate renewed its PC-based music download service as Mora.
LGT started to sell unregulated MP3 phones.
8 Fair Trade Commission began investigating antitrust concerns about Label
Mobile.
9 KDDI launched full-track music download service.
11
SKT started Mellon, the U-Music service. LGT reached copyright agreement
with music copyright institutional bodies and recording companies.
12 Vodafone launched longer version of ringing song download service.
LGT started Music On, the U-Music service with free 6-month promotion plan.
1
3
5
7
8

Recording companies were recognized to hold Digital Transmission Right.
Fair Trade Commission issued recommendation to five major founders of Label Music copyright institutional bodies acquired 60 percent of Bugsmusic's
Mobile to allow the useage of ringing song copyrights more openly.
ownership.
KTF launched Dosirak, the U-Music service. SKT acquired YBM Seoul
Records.
LGT began charging Music On service.
Vodafone started full-track music download service. /Apple launched iTunes
Court ordered Soribada to stop service.
Music Store in Japan.
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